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Abstract: The paper shows that, in some important respects, the diﬀer-
ences between the Nash equilibrium and competing concepts such as the quantal-
response equilibrium are smaller than they appear. I start from the observation
that, in many experiments, parameter shifts that leave the Nash equilibrium un-
changed aﬀect behavior. I explain the direction of change with a heuristic structural
approach, relying on properties such as strategic complementarities and increasing
diﬀerences. I justify the approach using existing comparative statics results for
the Nash equilibrium and new comparative statics results for the quantal response
equilibrium. Further, I show that the experimental observations can also be ratio-
nalized by a model of adjustment to change that does not rely on any equilibrium
concept. Finally, I relate the structural approach to equilibrium selection concepts.
–––––––––––––––––––––
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1 Introduction
Laboratory experiments have cast doubt on the predictive value of the Nash
equilibrium and its refinements. At least the joint hypothesis that monetary
payoﬀs are maximized and the Nash equilibrium is played is often in conflict
with the facts.1 Nevertheless, as argued by Samuelson (2005), even when
point predictions do not hold, comparative statics predictions may still be
borne out in the lab.2 However, in an insightful contribution, Goeree and Holt
(2001), henceforth GH, report the results of ten pairs of experiments where
the Nash equilibrium is the same in both cases, but nevertheless subjects
behave diﬀerently. Thus, not only the point predictions are wrong, but even
the comparative statics implication that behavior should not be aﬀected by
the parameter change fails to hold.
GH and various companion papers provide explanations for some of the
observed deviations from Nash behavior in these experiments and in related
work.3 These explanations diﬀer across experiments. In several cases, GH
appeal to the quantal response equilibrium (QRE) of Mc Kelvey and Pal-
frey (1995) which does not presuppose that players choose best responses to
the expected behavior of others, but allows for the possibility of errors. In
other examples, they argue that social preferences can explain the paradoxes.
Finally, in cases with multiple equilibria that are unchanged by the parame-
ter change, they show that selection theories, based on risk dominance and
potential maximization help to understand the observations.4
1For instance, subjects only rely on iterated elimination of dominated strategies to a
limited extent (Beard and Beil 1994). Deviations from the Nash prediction also occur
in games where social preferences matter, including public goods games (Ledyard 1995),
ultimatum games (Güth et al. 1982) and trust games (Fehr et al. 1993).
2Samuelson himself points out the limitations of his statement, mentioning bargaining
experiments of Ochs and Roth (1989) where the eﬀects of the discount factor and the
length of the game are inconsistent with standard predictions.
3Related papers include Anderson et al. (2001, 2002), Capra et al. (1999), Goeree and
Holt (2005) and Goeree et al. (2003).
4Another promising approach to understanding the GH paradoxes was provided by
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This paper presents a unified explanation of the treatment eﬀects in sev-
eral GH puzzles, without making any attempt to provide point predictions.
I start from a simple observation that has gone unrecognized in the liter-
ature: 6 of the 10 pairs of experiments analyzed by GH share important
structural properties. First, for suitable partial orders on strategy spaces
they are games with strategic complementarities (GSC): Both players’ best
responses are weakly increasing in the actions of the other player. Second,
an increasing diﬀerence condition (ID) holds: In one of the treatments (H),
for each initial strategy profile, the incremental payoﬀ from increasing the
own action is weakly higher than in the other one (L). These two properties
combined give a clear intuition why players are likely to choose higher ac-
tions in H than in L. First, because incremental payoﬀs are higher in H than
in L, incentives to increase actions are higher in H for fixed behavior of the
other player. Second, if players accordingly believe that the opponents will
choose higher actions in game H, this reinforces the tendency to choose high
actions by GSC. Based on these two structural properties of the game, it is
therefore intuitive to predict that actions are weakly higher for H than for
L, even though direct calculation of Nash equilibria predicts no change.
Crucially, the direction of change in the six GH puzzles satisfying strategic
complementarities (SC) and ID is always predicted correctly in this fashion.
In addition, a similar structure-based prediction in another GH example that
is not a GSC is confirmed by the data.5 In the remaining three cases, this
heuristic structural approach does not yield the wrong predictions. It is
not applicable, because the games are too complex to allow for comparative
statics results that are based purely on the structural properties of the game.
The very fact that the structural approach is intuitive and provides cor-
rect predictions for 7 out of 10 GH examples (and many other similar experi-
ments) might be regarded as a suﬃcient justification for its use. Nevertheless,
Eichberger and Kelsey (2007) who appeal to ambiguity aversion to explain the deviations
from equilibrium behavior.
5This example (generalized matching pennies) is not a GSC, but is simple because the
parameter only enters the payoﬀs of one player.
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I oﬀer several possible foundations. The first one is most closely related to
existing literature. According to well-known monotone comparative statics
results of Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and Vives (1990), the smallest and the
largest Nash equilibrium of a parameterized GSC satisfying ID are weakly
increasing in the parameter. Thus, by focusing on such general structural
properties rather than on the specific payoﬀ functions, one can obtain the
weak comparative statics prediction identifying the direction of change pro-
vided there is any change at all. Whether the equilibrium changes, is not
part of the prediction: The result for the GH examples that the equilibrium
does not change is also consistent with such weak predictions. Thus, even
though players do not play the Nash equilibrium in every single game, the
(weak) comparative statics are predicted accurately by results that are based
on the general structural properties of the Nash equilibrium rather than on
the specific details. One reason why this is so may be that subjects are play-
ing the Nash equilibrium of some game belonging to a wider class with the
same structural properties. For instance, suppose actual payoﬀs result from
a perturbation of monetary payoﬀs (for instance, because players have social
preferences). The perturbation does not have to be small, as long as it does
not destroy the basic structural properties. Then, the Nash equilibrium of
the perturbed game still satisfies the weak comparative statics predicted by
the structural approach. As long as one is exclusively concerned with com-
parative statics rather than point predictions, the source of the perturbation
is irrelevant.
As another justification of the structural approach, I show that the QRE
satisfies the same weak comparative statics as the Nash equilibrium: In GSC
satisfying ID, if the parameter increases, the equilibrium weakly increases
in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance. Thus, in spite of the well-
known diﬀerences between the Nash equilibrium and the QRE, they provide
similar comparative statics predictions in an important class of games.
Next, I show that a simple set of behavioral adjustment rules leads to the
same comparative statics as the structural approach (and the logit equilib-
4
rium) and is thus also consistent with the experimental evidence. These ad-
justment dynamics share certain properties with well-known dynamics that
are derived from standard Cournot best-response dynamics,6 but they do
not necessarily require that the adjustment process is justifiable via best
responses.
Finally, I show that, in symmetric games with ID and multiple parameter-
independent equilibria, the comparative statics predictions implied by equi-
librium selection by risk dominance and potential maximization are consis-
tent with the approach proposed here.
To sum up, the main message of the paper is that several diﬀerent the-
oretical approaches can all rationalize existing comparative statics puzzles.
This obviously makes it hard to discriminate between these theories. How-
ever, it is good news in the sense that, for an important class of games, we
can quite confidently predict the direction of treatment eﬀects, because the
predictions can be based on a wide variety of diﬀerent arguments.
In Section 2, I will sketch three of the GH examples. In Section 3, I
will introduce the structural approach as a heuristic. Sections 4 and 5 relate
the approach to the Nash equilibrium and the QRE, respectively. Section
6 derives the approach from adjustment dynamics. Section 7 discusses the
relation to selection theories. Section 8 concludes.
2 Introductory examples
I shall first sketch three of the ten GH examples.
(i) In the Kreps game, players choose actions from X1 = {0, 1} and X2 =
{0, 1, 2, 3}, respectively. Table 1 gives payoﬀs, where θ ∈ R+.
For all θ ∈ Θ, there are two pure Nash equilibria ((0, 0) and (1, 3)). In
addition, there is a mixed-strategy equilibrium where player 1 chooses x1 = 0
with probability 30/31, and player 2 chooses x2 = 0 with probability 1/21
and x2 = 1 with probability 20/21. Thus, an increase of θ does not aﬀect
6See, e.g., Milgrom and Roberts 1990, Echenique 2002.
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x2 = 0 x2 = 1 x2 = 2 x2 = 3
x1 = 0 200, 50 0, 45 10, 30 20,−250
x1 = 1 0,−250 10,−100 30, 30 θ + 50, 65θ + 40
Table 1: Kreps Game
the equilibrium structure. However, GH report the following results. For
θ = 0, 32% of the subjects in the role of player 1 chose the high action 1;
whereas 96% did so for θ = 300. For θ = 0, no subject in the role of player 2
chose x2 = 3, but 84% did so for θ = 300. Thus, the experimental evidence
suggests that, as θ increases, more subjects choose high actions.
I am interested in this particular comparative statics observation of GH.7
One could of course explain it with selection arguments, based for instance on
payoﬀ dominance. However, my goal is to find an explanation of treatment
eﬀects that also applies to games with unique parameter-independent Nash
equilibria such as the following.
(ii) In theTraveler’s Dilemma,8 two players i = 1, 2 simultaneously choose
integers xi ∈ {180, ..., 300}. Each player is paid the minimum of the chosen
numbers; in addition, the player with the lower number receives a transfer
R > 1 from the player with the higher number. Therefore, defining θ = −R,
πi (xi, xj; θ) = min (xi, xj) + θ · sign (xi − xj) . (1)
The dots on the lines in Figure 1 give the reaction functions for any θ ∈
Θ = (−∞,−1). Thus, for all θ the game has a unique Nash equilibrium
x1 = x2 = 180.9 GH considered θ = −5 and θ = −180.10 For θ = −180, 80%
of the subjects chose actions between 180 (the minimum) and 185, whereas
80% choose actions between 295 and 300 (the maximum) for θ = −5. Thus,
7GH emphasize that for θ = 0 many subjects (68%) choose x2 = 2, the only action
that is neither part of a pure-strategy equilibrium nor of a mixed-strategy equilibrium.
8The game goes back to Basu (1994).
9This equilibrium is also the unique rationalizable strategy profile.
10Similar results have been obtained by Capra et al. (1999) for other parametrizations.
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Figure 1: Traveler’s Dilemma
as in the Kreps Game, even though the Nash equilibrium is independent of
θ, a parameter increase induces higher actions.
(iii) In the common-interest proposal game (GH, Figure 3), two players
move sequentially, according to the game tree in Figure 2.11 Thus, the strat-
egy spaces are X1 = X2 = {0, 1}. The parameter space is Θ = (0, 60). For
all θ ∈ Θ, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium is x1 = x2 = 0. GH
considered θ = 0 and θ = 58. For θ = 0, 84% of the subjects in the role
of player 1 and all the subjects in the role of player 2 chose the equilibrium
actions xi = 0. For θ = 58, however, the corresponding figures are only 46%
and 75% respectively. Hence, higher parameter values lead to higher actions.
Summing up, the following cases arise in the examples: (i) multiple pure-
strategy equilibria, (ii) a unique pure-strategy equilibrium, or (iii) a unique
subgame-perfect equilibrium. In all the examples, however, the set of pure-
strategy equilibria is parameter-independent, but there are nevertheless clear
treatment eﬀects.
11I use the name “common-interest proposal game”, because (0, 0) is the optimal out-
come for both players.
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Figure 2: A Common-Interest Proposal Game
3 The structural approach
I will now introduce the heuristic structural approach to predict treatment
eﬀects even when the set of Nash equilibria is independent of treatments, as
in the above examples. To repeat, the approach makes no attempt to explain
why the observed play corresponds closely to the equilibrium in one case, but
not in the other; it merely predicts the direction of change in behavior across
treatments, not the relation to the equilibrium in any single experiment.
3.1 Defining the structural approach
In all the examples, there are players i = 1, 2, strategy spaces Xi and payoﬀ
functions πi(xi, xj, θ), where θ ∈ Θ, a partially ordered set, such that:
1. Xi is independent of θ;
2. Xi is a finite set;12
12This assumption can be weakened considerably at the cost of greater technicalities. For
the purposes of interpreting the experimental evidence, the set-up is suﬃciently general.
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3. Xi is equipped with a partial order ≥ that is independent of θ, with
respect to which Xi forms a lattice.13
The following properties of the game are crucial.
Definition 1 (i) πi satifies increasing diﬀerences in (xi; θ),(ID), if
∆i
¡
xHi , x
L
i ;xj; θ
¢
≡ πi
¡
xHi , xj; θ
¢
− πi
¡
xLi , xj; θ
¢
is weakly increasing in θ, that is, ∆i
¡
xHi , xLi ;xj; θ
H¢ ≥ ∆i ¡xHi , xLi ;xj; θL¢ for
all xHi > xLi , θ
H > θL, i = 1, 2, j 6= i.
(ii) πi is supermodular (SUP) if ∆i
¡
xHi , xLi ;xj; θ
¢
is weakly increasing in xj
for all xHi > xLi , i = 1, 2, j 6= i.
By (i), an increase in θ has the direct eﬀect of weakly increasing the
incremental payoﬀ for each player. Thus, for fixed behavior of the other
player, increasing own actions becomes (weakly) more attractive, so that
reaction functions are weakly increasing in θ.14 By (ii), the payoﬀ increase
from increasing xi is non-decreasing in xj for j 6= i. Thus, the optimal
response of player i is weakly increasing in xj, that is, the game is a GSC.
The positive direct eﬀects of higher θ on xi and the induced indirect eﬀects
on xj are mutually reinforcing. Together, ID and SUP therefore suggest a
(weakly) positive eﬀect of θ on actions. I thus introduce the following central
tool for predictions.
Definition 2 For a GSC which satisfies ID with respect to θ ∈ Θ, the
structure-based prediction of treatment eﬀects is that the frequency dis-
tribution of observed play for θH weakly dominates the corresponding distri-
bution for θL < θH according to first-order stochastic dominance (FOSD).15
13A lattice requires that the infimum and supremum of each pair of elements exists in
Xi. In the following, the lattice structure will typically come from a complete order on a
finite set.
14A formal version of this statement relies on Lemma 1 in the Appendix.
15In a finite game, this reduces to the requirement that, as θ increases, the fraction
of players choosing an action up to and including any predetermined level of xi weakly
decreases.
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3.2 Experimental evidence
The first justification for such structure-based predictions is that they are
applicable in many examples, and that they are confirmed in this examples.
As an illustration, take the Kreps game. Straightforward derivations show
that this game satisfies SUP and ID with respect to the standard (total)
orders on X1, X2 and θ.16 The structure-based prediction is thus that for
θH = 300 players tend to choose higher actions than for θL = 0. This is
precisely the observed outcome. The overly strong independence prediction
obtained by simple comparison of Nash equilibria for diﬀerent parameter val-
ues is a boundary case of the structure-based prediction that the equilibrium
is weakly increasing in θ. While the independence prediction does not survive
empirical scrutiny because a change in θ changes the observed actions, the
weaker comparative statics prediction is consistent with the facts.
This argument illustrates the central message of the paper: By ignoring
details of the game and focusing instead on basic structural properties, one
often obtains a weak prediction of treatment eﬀects that is consistent with
the evidence. The structural approach is a powerful tool for explaining com-
parative statics puzzles. For instance, the same logic can be applied to five
other GH examples. Most immediately, the common-interest proposal game,
the related conflicting-interest proposal game17 and the extended coordina-
tion game also satisfy SUP and ID with respect to suitable parameters and
partial orders.18 In all three cases, like in the Kreps game, there are clear
treatment eﬀects, even though the equilibrium set is independent of θ.
Two other GH games, the traveler’s dilemma and an auction game, are
not supermodular, but nevertheless GSC. To illustrate, consider the traveler’s
16As to ID, for both players, an increase in θ raises the benefit from choosing the highest
action (x1 = 1 and x2 = 3) rather than any other one, whereas there is no relation between
θ and the benefit for player 2 from increasing x2 from 0 to 1 or 2, or from 1 to 2. As to
SUP, for instance for player 1, the incremental payoﬀs increase from −200 to 10, 20 and
finally θ + 30 as player 2 increases his actions from 0 to 3.
17I use this term for the game described in Figure 4 of GH.
18Details of the arguments are available upon request.
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dilemma. Because ID still holds,19 a reduction in the transfer parameter R,
or equivalently, an increase in θ, increases incremental payoﬀs. Hence, even
though θ has no eﬀect on the reaction function in the specific example, the
game structure suggests that player i’s reaction to xj is weakly increasing
in θ.20 The traveler’s dilemma corresponds to the boundary case where the
reaction functions are unaﬀected by the parameter change even though ID
holds. Ignoring all details of the game structure except ID and SC suggests
that a parameter increase has the direct eﬀect of increasing actions for both
players, and that these eﬀects are mutually reinforcing, so that actions should
increase with θ, as required by the structure-based prediction.
Beyond the GH examples, many authors have investigated coordination
games, which can be addressed similarly. As an example, consider an eﬀort
coordination game21 with payoﬀs
πi (xi, xj; θ) = min (xi, xj) + θ · xi,
where xi ∈ {0, 1, ...,M} and θ = −c for some eﬀort cost parameter c ∈ (0, 1).
For c < 1, the set of pure-strategy equilibria is the diagonal (x1 = x2).
Thus, if one uses the set of pure-strategy equilibria to predict responses to
parameter changes, increases in costs should have no eﬀect on equilibrium
eﬀort. The comparative statics become more counter-intuitive if one allows
for mixed-strategy equilibria. For instance, for Xi = {0, 1}, there is an equi-
librium such that each player chooses xi = 1 with probability c. Thus, as
19To see this, first note that, because of the termmin (xi, xj) in the payoﬀ function, there
is an incentive to choose high actions. The term θ ·sign (xi − xj) acts as a counterbalance,
but less so as θ approaches zero from below. Therefore, the incremental payoﬀ from
increasing xi is non-decreasing in θ.
20Again, Lemma 1 in the Appendix provides the formal justification of this argument.
21Several authors have analyzed the eﬀects of changing various parameters in other 2×2-
coordination games satisfying (SUP) and (ID). For instance, in the experiments of Huettel
and Lockhead (2000), Schmidt et al. (2003), and most of the experiments of Guyer and
Rapoport (1972), the comparative-statics predictions correspond exactly to those obtained
from the structural approach, and the arguments are similar as in the following discussion
of eﬀort coordination games. The propositions of this paper are not applicable for the
“Benefit-to-other”-treatment of Guyer and Rapoport, because (ID) does not hold.
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costs increase, agents put more weight on the high eﬀort level, so that, para-
doxically, eﬀort increases with costs. Unsurprisingly, experimental results
(van Huyck et al. 1990; Goeree and Holt 2005) show that for lower c more
subjects choose higher eﬀort. The structural approach resolves the tension
between theoretical predictions and empirical observations. Eﬀort coordina-
tion games are supermodular, because the net benefit from increasing eﬀort
is 1− c > 0 if the original eﬀort level is smaller than the eﬀort of the other
player, and −c < 0 otherwise. Thus, πi satisfies ID. Therefore, the structural
prediction is that actions are weakly increasing in θ.
Another application concerns public goods experiments (e.g., Ledyard
1995), which display clear behavioral eﬀects of the return on investment
which again cannot be captured by comparison of Nash equilibria. The games
satisfy ID, and SUP holds trivially because payoﬀs are additively separable.
The very fact that the predictions of the structural approach are consis-
tent with the experimental evidence is a strong argument in its favor. In
addition, the intuition for this observation is straightforward. Even subjects
who, for whatever reason, do not display Nash behavior, are likely to under-
stand the two basic structural properties: (i) High incremental payoﬀs make
high actions attractive for given actions of the other player; (ii) incremental
payoﬀs increase with the other player’s action. If players understand these
two properties, and if they believe that other players do so, too, then they
should choose high actions for high parameter values.
Before turning to more precise justifications of the structural approach, I
note that a slight modification of the idea can be used to show that a seventh
GH example, the generalized matching pennies game, can be explained along
similar lines, even though it is not a GSC (See Appendix 2 for details).22
22In this example, with an appropriate order on strategy spaces, a higher parameter
increases the equilibrium action of one player, but leaves the action of the other player
constant; while observed actions of both players are aﬀected. Any order on the strategy
space implies that the actions are SC for one player, but strategic substitutes (SS) for the
other one. However, because the parameter only aﬀects one of the two payoﬀ functions, an
intuitive structure-based prediction of treatment can be given even so, and this intuitive
12
Nash Prediction Game Observed Actions Reason
Unique pure Nash Traveler’s dilemma Increasing in θ SC +
equilibrium (Capra et al. 1999, GH) ID
independent of θ Public goods games SUP +
(Ledyard 1995) ID
Unique SPE Proposal games Increasing in θ SUP +
independent of θ (GH Fig. 3 and 4) ID
Unique mixed Matching pennies Player 2: increasing SC/SS
equilibrium: (Ochs 1995, GH) Player 1: decreasing ID
increasing in θ for
player 2, constant
for player 1
Unique Bayesian Auction game (GH) Increasing in θ SC +
Equilibrium ID
independent of θ
Multiple pure Kreps game (GH) Increasing in θ SUP +
equilibria; Extended coordination ID
mixed equilibrium game (GH)
is independent of θ
Multiple pure Nash Eﬀort coordination Increasing in θ SUP +
equilibria where (Van Huyck et al. 1990, ID
mixed equilibrium is Goeree and Holt 2005)
decreasing in θ Wolf’s dilemma
(Huettel-Lockhead 2000)
Period-2 equilibrium Capacity game Period-2 actions SUP +
independent of (Brandts et al. 2003) increasing in own ID
first-period play period-1 action,
decreasing in
opponent’s.
Table 2: Summary of Results
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As summarized in Table 2, the structural approach can thus explain the
evidence in seven of the ten examples provided by GH. In the remaining cases,
it does not provide a false prediction. It is simply not applicable because
the games do not have suitable structural properties. Loosely speaking, the
direct and indirect eﬀects of parameter changes are not mutually reinforcing,
so that general comparative statics results cannot be derived.
4 Nash equilibrium and structural approach
A first more formal justification of the structural approach relies on a famil-
iar comparative statics results for the Nash equilibrium that was shown for
supermodular games by Milgrom and Roberts 1990, but extends to GSC.23
Proposition 1 Suppose ID and GSC hold. Then
(i) A smallest and a largest pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exist.
(ii) For both equilibria, the actions of each player are weakly increasing in θ.
Statement (i) not only guarantees existence of a Nash equilibrium, but
also makes sure that the smallest and largest equilibrium are well-defined.24
Part (ii) provides a comparative statics prediction that is fully in line with
the empirical evidence for the six GH-games that are GSC, namely that,
if the equilibrium changes, it should move upwards. As a boundary case,
Proposition 1 contains the prediction derived from direct calculation of the
Nash equilibria in the GH-examples that the actions do not change with θ.
However, consideration of the structural properties, “forgetting” the details
of the payoﬀ functions, suggests that, if actions change at all, they should
increase with θ. One way to make this point more precise is to consider the
following more specific argument.
prediction can be justified as in the GSC case.
23See Vives (1999, p. 35).
24The smallest equilibrium exists if and only if the profile consisting of the minimal equi-
librium action for each player is itself an equilibrium; similarly for the largest equilibrium.
Of course, for some or all values of θ, the smallest and largest equilibrium may coincide.
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4.1 Nash equilibria of perturbed games
Suppose actual payoﬀs are perturbations of monetary payoﬀs, for instance,
because players have social preferences. Specifically, suppose that instead of
the monetary payoﬀ functions πi, players have objective functions
bπi (xi, xj; θ) = πi (xi, xj; θ) + gi (xi, xj; θ) , (2)
such that πi satisfies SC and ID and the perturbation gi is such that bπi still
has this property. This could be true because gi is small, but this is by no
means the only possibility. For instance, if πi and gi both satisfy ID and
SUP in (xi, θ), so does bπi, no matter how large the perturbation is. Clearly,
Proposition 1 can still be applied: Hence, even though the Nash equilibrium
for bπi may diﬀer substantially from the equilibrium for πi, the equilibrium is
still weakly increasing in θ.
Of course, to obtain point predictions, the perturbation would have to
be specified. As long as one is exclusively concerned with weak comparative
statics, however, there is no need to do so. Any specification of perturbations
such that actual payoﬀs bπi and monetary payoﬀs πi both have properties
SC and ID justifies weak comparative statics conclusions for bπi based on
the structural properties of πi. However, only suitable perturbations will
guarantee that the equilibrium set for bπi is increasing in θ, rather than merely
non-decreasing. In situations where the equilibrium structure is independent
of θ for πi, but the observed behavior is increasing, the correct choice of bπi
should capture this possibility.
To illustrate the idea, consider the eﬀort coordination game with Xi =
{0, 1}. Let k > 0 and consider the eﬀort coordination game with two eﬀort
levels and perturbation term gi (xi, xj; θ) = kmax (xj − xi, 0). Thus, agents
display spiteful behavior, gaining utility if the other player has exercised
useless eﬀort. The payoﬀ matrix of the perturbed game is given in Table 3.
Suppose k < 1. Then the perturbed game still satisfies ID and SUP, and
Proposition 1 predicts that the smallest and largest equililibrium are both
weakly increasing in θ. Closer inspection reveals that the equilibrium set
15
depends on θ: For high costs (θ < −(1 − k)), the only equilibrium is (0, 0).
For low costs (θ > −(1 − k)), there are multiple equilibria, including (1, 1)
as well. Thus, with this specification of preferences, the largest equilibrium
is strictly increasing in θ.
Summing up, for both πi and bπi = πi + gi the smallest and largest equi-
librium are weakly increasing in θ. However, it is independent of θ for πi,
whereas it is strictly increasing in θ for bπi. Thus, if the true behavioral model
is given by bπi, weak comparative-statics conclusions derived from the prop-
erties ID and SC of πi are correct, but for the stronger conclusion that the
equilibrium set changes with θ, it is necessary to have a perturbation of πi
(e.g., by gi).
x2 = 0 x2 = 1
x1 = 0 0, 0 k, θ
x1 = 1 θ, k 1 + θ, 1 + θ
Table 3: Payoﬀs in the Perturbed Eﬀort Coordination Game Game
Of course, the interesting aspect of this section is not that there exist
suitable perturbations for which the comparative-statics can be rationalized.
In view of the substantial degrees of freedom, this should be expected.25 It is
much more interesting that the weak comparative statics carry over for wide
classes of perturbations.
5 The quantal response equilibrium
The most popular approach to the GH puzzles is based on the quantal re-
sponse equilibrium (QRE) introduced by Mc Kelvey and Palfrey (1995). This
concept does not presuppose best responses; instead players can make errors.
Specifically, consider a finite game with strategy spaces Xi = {0, 1, ..., ni};
denote the probabilities with which player i chooses action xi as pixi. Let
25See also the related discussion of the QRE below.
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εi = (εi1, ..., εini) be a vector of perturbations for player i, drawn from a
joint density fi. Then, by assumption, player i chooses ν ∈ Xi if and only if
ν maximizes the sum of the expected payoﬀ and the perturbation, that is,
njX
xj=0
pjxjπi (ν, xj; θ) + εiν ≥
njX
xj=0
pjxjπi (xi, xj; θ) + εixi ∀xi 6= ν. (3)
Using this condition, one immediately arrives at the stochastic best-response
function or quantal response function that assigns to each probability vector
pj for player j the probability vector pi = pi(pj; θ) of choices for player i
defined by the requirement that εi satisfies (3). A QRE requires that each
player’s own error distribution is consistent with stochastic best response.
The next comparative statics result shows that the similarity in the pre-
dictions of the structural approach and the QRE is not a coincidence. As in
Haile et al. (2007), I assume that a parameter shift leaves the error distrib-
ution unchanged; this invariance assumption is discussed by these authors.
Proposition 2 Suppose a finite game with strategy spaces Xi = {0, 1, ..., ni}
satisfies SUP and ID. Suppose for a fixed error distribution, a unique QRE
p(θ) = (p1(θ),p2(θ)) exists for every θ. Then, an increase in θ shifts the
equilibrium distribution p(θ) = (p1(θ),p2(θ)) weakly according to first-order
stochastic dominance (FOSD).
Thus, a parameter increase in a game satisfying (SUP) and (ID) implies
that higher choices become more likely for the logit equilibrium. The in-
tuition for the result is quite similar to the intuition for Proposition 1. As
the parameter θ shifts upwards, increasing diﬀerences imply that, for fixed
behavior of the opponent, players are more likely to respond with higher ac-
tions. Anticipating this, it becomes even more attractive for both players to
increase their actions.
Paralleling the discussion in the previous section, the interesting aspect
of Proposition 1 is not that that there exists some kind of QRE for which
the comparative statics property holds, but that this holds quite generally
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(under the invariance assumption). Haile et al. (2008) have shown that,
because of the degrees of freedom in specifying the error distributions, the
QRE can explain any behavior in any given game. Nevertheless, as the
authors themselves point out, the QRE may still put restrictions on possible
comparative statics under the invariance assumption. However, Haile et al.
(2008, Theorem 2) follow a completely diﬀerent approach: They are interested
in observing whether the behavior observed ex-post is consistent with agents
putting greater weight on actions that, given the observed distribution of
play, have benefited more from the parameter increase than others in terms
of expected payoﬀ. To the contrary, Proposition 1 gives comparative statics
predictions purely on the basis of structural properties that are known ex
ante.
6 Adjustment dynamics
The next contribution of the paper involves a more radical suggestion: To
derive comparative statics results, it is not essential to apply an equilibrium
concept. All that is required is an appropriate theory of change. This can best
be explained by starting from standard adjustment theories, as presented for
instance in Milgrom and Roberts (1990), Milgrom and Shannon (1994) and
Echenique (2002). As the simplest case, take the framework of Section 3.1,
and assume that best-responses are unique. Define Cournot best-response
dynamics after a parameter increase from θL to θH as a sequence
©
xk
ª
=©
xk1, xk2
ª
; k = 0, 1, ..., as follows:
(ADJ1) x0 ∈ x(θL), the old equilibrium set of the game
(ADJ2) For k ≥ 1, xk = φ(xk−1), that is, xk results from best responses to xk−1.
Then, for GSC, these adaptive dynamics have the following properties if
the objective functions satisfy ID.
(ADJ3) x1 ≥ x0 (because of ID)
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(ADJ4) xk+1 ≥ xk (because of GSC)
(ADJ5) limk→∞xk ∈
£
inf x(θH), supx(θH)
¤
Thus
©
xk
ª
is monotone increasing, and hence limk→∞xk ≥ x0. The ex-
isting literature has shown that, for GSC, the limits of adjustment dynamics
have similar properties, even when best-responses are non-unique and ad-
justment dynamics are more general. For instance, Milgrom and Roberts
(1990) consider adjustment dynamics in supermodular games such that, for
any date, there is a later date after which players select a strategy that is
justifiable as a best response to behavior that is in the interval of past play.
They show that all accumulation points are in the interval bounded by the
smallest and largest new equilibrium. For similar “generalized adjustment
dynamics”,26 Echenique (2002), shows that, if play starts below the smallest
best response in a GSC (for instance, because of an upward parameter shift),
then the set of limits is contained in the same interval.
To provide restrictions on the limit of such adjustment processes in terms
of past play, as in (ADJ5), it is clearly necessary to impose conditions such
as (ADJ1) and (ADJ2) or mild generalizations that relate adjustment be-
havior to best responses. For the weaker conclusion required here that the
limit of the adjustment sequence exists and lies above the starting point,
much weaker requirements are suﬃcient. This conclusion holds trivially for
arbitrary sequences xk = φ(xk−1) such that:
(ADJ6) The immediate response to a change of parameter is weakly positive
(x1 ≥ x0)
(ADJ7) φ is increasing.
These conditions can be justified without direct reference to (ADJ1) and
(ADJ2) or even without assuming that choices are justifiable in terms of past
26Echenique makes the stronger requirement that play is always in the interval of best-
responses to previous play (not only eventually).
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play. Suppose that observed behavior in the treatment corresponding to θL is
given by x0, which can be below or above the old equilibrium (for instance,
because players have perturbed objective functions). Next postulate that
x1 reflects the immediate adjustment to change, not taking into account
possible adjustments of the other player. This adjustment may or may not
be a best response to x0. For instance, instead of resulting from a best
response for monetary payoﬀs πi, it could reflect best responses for bπi (as
in Section 4.1). If ID is satisfied, then the incremental value of increasing
the action for fixed behavior of the other players increases. Even if the
adjustment does not come from a best response, one should therefore expect
that x1 ≥ x0, as required by (ADJ6). Indeed, using Lemma 1, this conclusion
will for instance be true if players best-respond to the previous choices with
the perturbed payoﬀs bπi rather than πi. Thus, each player’s immediate
response to a parameter increase should be to increase the own action weakly.
Similarly, (ADJ7) can be justified as reflecting indirect eﬀects, even when
the adjustment does not result from best responses: SUP guarantees that
a player i who thinks that the other player has the immediate impulse to
increase his actions following a parameter increase (x1j ≥ x0j) should realize
that the marginal value of increasing an action increases even further. This
would imply x2 = φ(x1) ≥ φ(x0) = x1 which is (ADJ7) for k = 1.27 Iterating
the argument leads to a justification of (ADJ7) for arbitrary values of k.
To sum up, in a GSC satisfying ID, actions should increase after a pa-
rameter increase even if the adjustment dynamics does not explicitly follow
from best-responses with monetary payoﬀs. As long as players increase their
actions both as a direct response to a parameter increase and as an indirect
response to higher actions of other players, which is natural under ID and
SUP, actions will increase. Of course, convergence to a Nash equilibrium
is not guaranteed without more specific assumptions. At any point of the
sequence, behavior may be below or above the equilibrium set, depending on
27Again, this conclusion can be derived formally, by assuming that players best-respond
with a perturbed payoﬀ function as in Section 4.1.
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whatever biases the players have.
7 Equilibrium Selection
The structural approach fits nicely with selection criteria such as risk dom-
inance (Harsanyi and Selten 1988). Consider a symmetric game with Xi =
{0, 1}, that is, as in eﬀort coordination games, payoﬀ functions are such that
π1 (x0, x00; θ) = π2 (x0, x00; θ) for arbitrary (x0, x00; θ) ∈ {0, 1} × {0, 1} × Θ.
Suppose there are two pure-strategy equilibria (0, 0) and (1, 1). (0, 0) is risk
dominant if both players prefer 0 if they expect the other player to choose
0 and 1 with probability 1/2 each. In eﬀort games, risk dominance predicts
that equilibria with higher eﬀort levels are chosen as costs decrease (Goeree
and Holt 2005). More generally, the comparative statics implied by the struc-
tural approach and by risk dominance coincide, as the following simple result
shows.28
Proposition 3 Consider a symmetric game with Xi = {0, 1}, such that ID
holds for the standard order on {0, 1}. Suppose that the set of Nash equilibria
is {(0, 0) , (1, 1)} for all θ ∈ Θ. Then, if (1, 1) is selected by risk dominance
for θL; it is also selected for θH ≥ θL.
Proof. See Appendix.
An alternative approach to equilibrium selection that generalizes to games
with more than two players and continuous actions is available for potential
games (Monderer and Shapley 1996, Goeree and Holt 2005). Such games are
characterized by the existence of a potential V (x1, x2; θ) with the defining
property that π1 (x001, x2; θ)−π1 (x01, x2; θ) = V (x001, x2; θ)−V (x01, x2; θ) for all
x01, x001 ∈ X1, x2 ∈ X2, θ ∈ Θ, and analogously for π2.29 Potential-maximizing
28The discussion in Section 4.2 shows that, in symmetric games, (ID) suﬃces to generate
monotone comparative statics.
29With continuously diﬀerentiable games, this boils down to the requirement that the
partial derivatives of V with respect to each xi coincide with those of πi (xi, xj ; θ).
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strategy profiles are pure-strategy equilibria, but the converse is not necessar-
ily true (Monderer and Shapley 1996): In games with multiple equilibria such
as eﬀort coordination games, there is typically a unique potential-maximizing
profile which can be used for equilibrium selection. Monderer and Shapley
(1996) have already argued that, in eﬀort games, the observed eﬀects of in-
creasing costs can be explained using potential maximization, showing that,
in the experiments of van Huyck et al. (1990), potential maximization selects
the lowest equilibrium for high eﬀort costs and the highest equilibrium for
low eﬀort costs. This is true more generally.30
Proposition 4 In a symmetric game satisfying ID, suppose
¡
xH , xH
¢
and¡
xL, xL
¢
are unique potential maximizers for θH and θL (θH ≥ θL), respec-
tively. Then xL ≤ xH.
Proof. See Appendix.
Summing up, the structural approach yields comparative statics predic-
tions that are compatible with standard selection methods where they apply.
8 Conclusions
I have introduced a heuristic “structural” approach to predict treatment ef-
fects even when Nash equilibria are the same in the diﬀerent treatments.
The resulting comparative statics predictions are supported by the experi-
mental observations in all cases that I am aware of, in particular, in the GH
examples. I have shown that the structural approach is consistent with the
predictions of the QRE and, where it applies, of equilibrium theories. Fi-
nally, I explain treatment eﬀects by reference to an adjustment process that
does not require any equilibrium concept.
30Relatedly, Echenique (2004) shows that finite two player ordinal potential games are
GSC, so that when ID holds, the smallest and largest equilibrium must increase weakly
with parameters. Proposition 4 sharpens the result by showing that the same is true for
the potential maximizers.
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As GH have already explained some of the experimental observations un-
der consideration, it is legitimate to ask why another approach is needed.
First, the structural approach brings together two literatures that rarely
speak to each other, namely the experimental literature and the literature
on monotone comparative statics in games with strategic complementarities.
Hopefully, this exercise contains potential for further cross-fertilization.31
Second, the structural approach is more basic than the alternative sugges-
tions: Without imposing a particular story about what subjects do for any
given parameter value, it shows that structural properties of the game are
useful to explain treatment eﬀects. Third, I provide a unified explanation
of seven of the ten GH examples which, to my knowledge, no other single
approach does. While the QRE, for instance, has several useful applications
elsewhere, I am only aware of two types of GH paradoxes that are explained
by the concept.32 In addition, as I indicate in the paper, my predictions are
also borne out in many examples that were not treated by GH. Fourth, the
paper provides a suggestion that is interesting in its own right: To under-
stand comparative statics, it is not absolutely essential to have a theory of
point predictions — it suﬃces to have a theory of reaction to change. Finally,
though this was not detailed here, the approach can be applied to problems
that do not concern comparative statics directly. For instance, Brandts et
al. (2006) consider a two-stage game of capacity choice where the structural
approach correctly predicts the eﬀects of (endogenous) capacity choices on
second-period actions.33
31A vaguely related experimental contribution of Chen and Gazzale (2004) demonstrates
that learning in certain games with strategic complementarities, namely supermodular
games, works particularly well. However, the authors do not treat comparative statics.
32GH use the QRE to explain the traveler’s dilemma and the matching pennies game;
in addition, it is useful for eﬀort cost games.
33Two players can make costly, but not fully binding capacity commitments Ci before
they decide on investments Ii. Payoﬀ functions πi (Ii, Ij ;Ci, Cj) are supermodular in
(Ii,−Ij) and have increasing diﬀerences in (Ii, Ij ;Ci,−Cj). The subgame equilibria in
stage 2 are independent of first-period choices. Interpreting Ci and Cj as exogenous
parameters of the ensuing subgame, however, the structural approach correctly predicts
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It would be interesting to extend the approach to other solution con-
cepts. A natural candidate is the cognitive hierarchy model (e.g., Camerer
et al. 2004), which assumes that players diﬀer with respect to the extent of
strategic thinking they carry out. Like the QRE, the model is consistent with
comparative-statics observations in the games discussed here, for instance in
coordination games. It appears quite conceivable that general comparative
statics results are also available for cognitive hierarchy models in GSC.
In spite of the large number of conceivable applications, it is important
to recognize the limitations of the approach. First, obviously, it does not
provide point predictions. Second, there are examples where the direct and
indirect eﬀects of parameter changes are not mutually reinforcing, so that no
comparative statics predictions are possible without relying on the concrete
specification. Third, I am convinced that cleverly designed experiments can
show that there are some GSC satisfying ID, for which the observed actions
are not increasing in the parameter. The challenge for future experimental
work is to discover under which circumstances such violations of the struc-
tural approach will occur.
9 Appendix
9.1 Appendix 1: Proofs
The following well-known monotone comparative statics (Topkis 1978) result
will be helpful.
Lemma 1 Let f ((x, τ) be a real-valued function defined on X×T , where X
is a complete lattice and T is a partially ordered set. Suppose f satisfies in-
creasing diﬀerences with respect to (x, τ). Then g(τ) ≡ argmaxx∈X f ((x, τ)
is a weakly increasing correspondence.34
that Ii should be non-decreasing in Ci and non-increasing in Cj for j 6= i according to
Proposition 1.
34g(τ) is weakly increasing if τL < τH implies min g(τL) ≤ min g(τH) and max g(τL)
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In the following applications, X will correspond to the strategy set of one
player; τ will be the strategy set of the other player or the parameter θ.
9.1.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 2 is a simple corollary of the following result.
Lemma 2 Suppose πi (xi, xj; θ) satisfies SUP and ID. Then
(i) For fixed choice probabilities of the opponent, pj, an increase in θ shifts
the stochastic best response pi(pj; θ) according to FOSD.
(ii) The stochastic best response pi(pj; θ) is weakly increasing in pj.
Proof. (i) For ν ∈ {0, 1, ..., ni}, the probability that xi ≤ ν is chosen is
Pν(θ) = prob
⎛
⎝ max
xi∈{0,1,...,ν}
njX
xj=0
pjxjπi (xi, xj; θ) + εixi ≥
njX
xj=0
pjxjπi (x
0
i, xj; θ) + εix0i
⎞
⎠
∀x0i > ν. (4)
By ID,
njX
xj=0
pjxjπi (xi, xj; θ)−
njX
xj=0
pjxjπi (x
0
i, xj; θ)
is weakly decreasing in θ for all x0i > ν. Because εix0i − εixi is independent of
θ by the invariance property, Pν(θ) is therefore weakly decreasing in θ.
(ii) Suppose r < s ∈ {0, ..., xj}. It suﬃces to show that replacing any pj
by pjε ≡
³
pj0, ...,pjr − ε, ...,pjs + ε, ...,pjnj
´
for ε ∈ (0, qr] leads to an FOSD-
shift in pi. This will be true if, as ε increases, Pν(θ) is weakly larger for ε = 0
than for ε > 0 for all ν ∈ {0, 1, ..., ni}. This holds, because (SUP) implies
≤ max g(τH) , where the inequalities on X refer to some arbitrary partial order.
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njX
xj=0
pjεxjπi (xi, xj; θ)−
njX
xj=0
pjεxjπi (x
0
i, xj; θ)−
njX
xj=0
pjxjπi (xi, xj; θ) +
njX
xj=0
pjxjπi (x
0
i, xj; θ) = (5)
ε (πi (xi, s; θ)− πi (x0i, s; θ)− πi (xi, r; θ) + πi (x0i, r; θ)) ≤ 0. (6)
Now note that, with FOSD as a partial order, Pi the set of distributions on
Xi is a complete lattice (Echenique 2003, Lemma 1); this structure carries
over to P = Pi × Pj. Further, by Lemma 2, the stochastic best response
correspondence shifts out as θ increases. Denote the interval of probability
vectors in P that are greater or equal to some p as U(p). Since the best-
response correspondence for θH > θL is weakly increasing by part (ii) of the
lemma, it maps U(p(θL)) into itself. Its fixed point must therefore satisfy
p(θH) ≥ p(θL).
9.1.2 Proof of Proposition 3
In this symmetric setting, (1, 1) is selected by risk-dominance for θL if and
only if
πi
¡
1, 1; θL
¢
− πi
¡
0, 1; θL
¢
≥ πi
¡
0, 0; θL
¢
− πi
¡
1, 0; θL
¢
. (7)
Applying ID to both sides of (7) shows that analogous inequalities hold with
θL replaced with θH , so that (1, 1) is selected by risk-dominance for θH .
9.1.3 Proof of Proposition 4
For xL, xH ∈ X1 = X2, θ ∈
©
θL, θH
ª
, V
¡
xL, xL; θ
¢
− V
¡
xH , xH ; θ
¢
=
V
¡
xL, xL; θ
¢
− V
¡
xH , xL; θ
¢
+ V
¡
xH , xL; θ
¢
− V
¡
xH , xH ; θ
¢
.
26
Thus, the definition of the potential function implies
V
¡
xL, xL; θ
¢
− V
¡
xH , xH ; θ
¢
=
π1
¡
xL, xL; θ
¢
− π1
¡
xH , xL; θ
¢
+ π2
¡
xL, xH ; θ
¢
− π2
¡
xH , xH ; θ
¢
.
Using ID, therefore, if xL > xH (contrary to the assertion of the proposition),
for θH > θL
V
¡
xL, xL; θH
¢
− V
¡
xH , xH ; θH
¢
≥ V
¡
xL, xL; θL
¢
− V
¡
xH , xH ; θL
¢
.
Further, because xL is the unique maximizer of the potential function for θL,
V
¡
xL, xL; θL
¢
− V
¡
xH , xH ; θL
¢
> 0.
Taking the last two inequalities together, xH cannot maximize the potential
for θH , which contradicts its definition.
9.2 Appendix 2: Generalized matching pennies
Even for asymmetric games that do not satisfy SC, the structural approach
is sometimes useful. A case in point is generalized matching pennies, with
Xi = {0, 1} and Θ = {44, 80, 320} and payoﬀs as in Table 4.
x2 = 0 x2 = 1
x1 = 0 θ, 40 40, 80
x1 = 1 40, 80 80, 40
Table 4: Payoﬀs in the Generalized Matching Pennies Game
Identify a mixed strategy of player i, σi, with the probability of choosing
action 1. For all θ ∈ Θ = {44, 80, 320}, the reaction correspondence for
player 2 is given by the same dashed line R2 (σ1; θ) in Figure 3, while it
depends explicitly on θ for player 1. The unique mixed-strategy equilibrium
is σ∗1 =
1
2
, σ∗2 = 1− 40θ . Thus, unlike in the earlier examples, only player 1’s
equilibrium action is independent of θ: Player 2’s choice x2 is increasing in θ,
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Figure 3: Generalized Matching Pennies
as the probability with which x2 = 1 is played increases in θ. As θ increases
from 44 to 80 and 320, the percentage of subjects in the role of player 1
choosing the high action decreases from 92% to 52% and then to 4%, whereas
the corresponding values for player 2 increase from 20% to 52% and then to
84%. Thus, contrary to the prediction of the mixed-strategy equilibrium both
players’ actions change as θ does. Intuitively, as player 1’s payoﬀ function
satisfies ID with respect to (−x1, θ),35 an increase in θ directly reduces his
incremental benefits from higher actions.36 Next, because π2 (x2, x1; θ) is
supermodular in (x2,−x1),37 a reduction in x1 from 1 to 0 has the indirect
eﬀect of increasing the incremental benefit for player 2 from increasing x2
from 0 to 1.38 These properties suggest that, when θ increases, player 1’s
action should decrease, whereas player 2’s action should increase.
I first prove such a comparative statics result for games with four struc-
tural properties that hold for generalized matching pennies, but one addi-
35This means that ∆1
¡
xH1 , x
L
1 ;x2; θ
¢
is weakly decreasing in θ.
36When x2 = 0, this benefit is 40− θ; when x2 = 1, this benefit is independent of θ.
37This means that ∆2
¡
xH2 , x
L
2 ;x1; θ
¢
is weakly decreasing in x1.
38For x1 = 1, this incremental benefit is −40, for x1 = 0, it is 40.
28
tional requirement that obviously does not hold, namely existence of a unique
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 5 Suppose both players have well-defined reaction functions;
and there is a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium x(θ) for each θ. Suppose
further that the following properties hold:
(SUP1) π1 (x1, x2; θ) is supermodular in (x1, x2).
(SUP−2 ) π2 (x2, x1; θ) is supermodular in (x2,−x1).
(ID−1 ) π1 (x1, x2; θ) satisfies increasing diﬀerences in (−x1, θ).
(IND2) π2 (x2, x1; θ) is independent of θ.
Then x1(θ) is weakly decreasing in θ, and x2(θ) is weakly increasing in θ.
Proof. Let
¡
xL1 , xL2
¢
be the equilibrium for θL. By (SUP−2 ) and Lemma
1 the reaction function of player 2 is weakly decreasing in x1, and by (IND2),
R2
¡
x1; θL
¢
= R2
¡
x1; θH
¢
. Thus, the equilibrium
¡
xH1 , xH2
¢
for θH lies on
R2
¡
x1; θL
¢
, implying
xH1 ≤ xL1 and xH2 ≥ xL2 or xH1 ≥ xL1 and xH2 ≤ xL2 . (8)
It therefore suﬃces to show that xH1 ≥ xL1 and xH2 ≤ xL2 cannot hold simul-
taneously except if both hold with equality. First, I show that xH1 > xL1 and
xH2 < xL2 cannot hold simultaneously. Because R2
¡
xH1 ; θ
H¢ = R2 ¡xH1 ; θL¢ is
weakly decreasing by (SUP−2 ), clearly xH1 > xL1 implies xH2 = R2
¡
xH1 ; θ
H¢ ≥
R2
¡
xL1 ; θ
H¢ = R2 ¡xL1 ; θL¢ = xL2 . Next, I exclude the possibility that xH1 > xL1
and xH2 = xL2 . This would require that R2
¡
x1; θ
H¢ = R2 ¡xL1 ; θH¢ is horizon-
tal to the right of
¡
xL1 , xL2
¢
; the analogous statement would have to hold for
R1
¡
x2; θ
H¢. This would contradict uniqueness of the equilibrium. By similar
reasoning I exclude the possibility that xH2 < xL2 and xH1 = xL1 . Therefore (8)
requires xH1 ≤ xL1 and xH2 ≥ xL2 .
By (SUP1) and (SUP−2 ), actions are strategic complements for player 1
and strategic substitutes for player 2. Figure 4 suggests why a clear com-
parative statics result can be obtained even so. For simplicity, the figure
assumes continuous action spaces and presupposes that R1 (σ2; θ) is strictly
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Figure 4: Understanding Generalized Matching Pennies
increasing, whereas R2 (σ1; θ) is strictly decreasing; the proof of Proposition 5
extends the argument to reaction functions that are merely weakly increasing
and weakly decreasing, respectively. Crucially, an increase in the parameter
aﬀects only the payoﬀs of one player, shifting his (increasing) reaction func-
tion inwards while leaving the other player’s (decreasing) reaction function
constant. Hence, the equilibrium must move to the left and upwards.
Even though generalized matching pennies only has a mixed-strategy
equilibrium, the result applies. The mixed-strategy equilibrium can be shown
to be the pure-strategy equilibrium of a game satisfying the assumptions of
Proposition 5. This game has strategy space
P
i = [0, 1], corresponding to
the set of probability distributions on Xi; payoﬀs correspond to the expected
payoﬀs of the original game.39 Hence, comparative statics follow from basic
structural properties.
39A related procedure was applied by Echenique (2003) who shows that the mixed
extension of a GSC is still a GSC.
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